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The economy
Simon Ville
The rapid expansion and diversification of the economy in the twentieth century brought
immense wealth and many new opportunities to many Australians. Real per capita
income grew nearly sixfold in the century following Federation. When the first federal
parliament met on 9 May 1901, Australia was still suffering the effects of the 1890s
downturn, and it would wait another seven years until average incomes returned to their
pre-Depression peak of 1891. The following four decades were marked by the uncertainty
surrounding two world wars and an inter-war Depression. Higher levels of real income
began to be achieved by the mid-1930s but it was not until the second half of the century
that incomes rose sharply over a long period that was briefly interrupted by the minor
recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s. (See Figure 16.1.) 1

1

Australian GDP estimates are contested terrain. The original aggregations of N.G. Butlin (Australian
Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861–1938/39, Cambridge University Press,
1962) to World War 2 have been modified and updated especially by Matthew W. Butlin (‘A
Preliminary Annual Database 1900/01 to 1973/74’, Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of
Australia, May 1977) and Ian W. McLean and Jonathan J. Pincus (‘Living Standards in Australia
1890–1940: Evidence and Conjectures’, Working Papers in Economic History, no. 6 (Canberra:
Department of Economic History, ANU, 1982). Bryan Haig (‘New Estimates of Australian GDP: 1861–
1948/49’, Australian Economic History Review, 41, 1 (2001): 1–34) contests N.G. Butlin’s figures.
Angus Maddison (The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Paris: OECD, 2003) drew extensively on
Butlin but chose Haig’s revised data for 1911–12 to 1938–39. Leandro Prados de la Escosura
(‘International Comparisons of Real Product, 1820–1990’, Explorations in Economic History, 37
(2000): 1–41) criticises Maddison’s use of a recent constant prices base year, but the latter receives
support from Stephen Broadberry and Douglas A. Irwin (‘Lost Exceptionalism? Comparative Income
and Productivity in Australia and the UK, 1861–1948’, Economic Record, 83, 262 (2005): 262–74).
The benefit of the Maddison data is that they enable cross-country comparisons using a consistent
methodology.

Figure 1. Australian Real Gross Domestic
Product per capita, 1901-2000
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Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) – Angus Maddison
Homepage, ‘Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD’, table 3
<http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm>, accessed 1 April 2012 . Constant prices
in 1990 International Geary–Khamis dollars.
Accompanying substantial improvements in wealth were advances in wellbeing more
broadly. Working conditions for many employees improved, partly as a result of
industrial restructuring and innovation, but also because of greater attention to health and
safety practices that were codified into statutes in most States by the 1970s. Across the
twentieth century, the length of time that employees were required to spend at the
workplace was also reduced with the shortening of the working day, working week and
even working life. 2 Households benefitted from a widening range of new consumer
durables, which removed much of the physical labour and reduced the time of many daily

2

Ian McLean, ‘Economic Wellbeing’, in Rodney Maddock and Ian W. McLean (eds), The Australian Economy in
the Long Run (Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 321–7; Michael Carter and Rodney Maddock, ‘Leisure
and Wellbeing, 1911–81’, Australian Economic History Review 27, 1 (1987): 30–43.

chores. 3 People thus had more spare time to spend outside the working day, which
spurred much greater consumption of leisure services such as professional sport, theatre
and cinema. 4
More time and more money generated a third improvement in wellbeing: greater
choice. Higher incomes achieved through shorter hours of work put individuals and
households in a position where they could choose between work and leisure, knowing
that a preference for more of the latter would not risk putting them below the poverty line.
There is some evidence to suggest that leisure preferences were stronger in the first half
of the century, especially among men, than in the second, although part-time work has
become more common in recent decades. 5 The growth of branding and mass retailing
meant Australians could make more choices as consumers as well as producers.6
Improvements in choice have been particularly important for women, whose role in the
economy has diversified from primarily household managers to increased participation in
the workforce and higher education. 7 Indeed, some of the apparent improvement in
wealth represented by rising gross domestic product (GDP) reflects women entering the
workforce and hiring professional services for help with domestic tasks that were
formerly part of the non-monetised household economy. In a similar fashion, the
professionalisation of sport commercialised formerly amateur activities. Underpinning
these improvements was a significant increase in average life expectancy, which enabled
higher levels of income, leisure time and choice to be enjoyed over a longer period.
Between 1901–10 and 2004–06 male and female life expectancy at birth increased by 42
and 43 per cent respectively, from 55 to 78 and 58 to 83 respectively. 8

3

Tony Dingle, ‘Electrifying the Kitchen in Interwar Victoria’, Journal of Australian Studies, 22 (1988): 119–27.

4

Richard Cashman, Paradise of Sport: A History of Australian Sport (Sydney: Walla Walla Press, 2010); Wray
Vamplew and Brian Stoddart (eds), Sport in Australia: A Social History (Cambridge University Press, 1994);
John Tulloch, Australian Cinema: Industry, Narrative and Meaning (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982).

5

Carter and Maddock, ‘Leisure and Wellbeing, 1911–81’; Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Work’, in Measures of
Australia’s Progress, 2010, cat. no. 1370.0 (Canberra: ABS, 2010).

6

Greg Whitwell, Making the Market: The Rise of Consumer Society (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1989).

7

Alison L. Booth and Hiau Joo Kee, ‘A Long Run View of the University Gender Gap in Australia’, Australian
Economic History Review, 51, 3 (2011): 254–76; Glen Withers, Anthony M. Endres and Len Perry, ‘Labour’,
in Wray Vamplew (ed.), Australians: Historical Statistics (Sydney: Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates,
1987), p. 145.

8

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, March 2011, cat. no. 4102.0 (Canberra: ABS, 2011).

Modern comparative measurements of national wellbeing rank Australia highly. The
United Nations Human Development Index has been calculated annually among about
180 nations since 1990 and is based on longevity, knowledge and standard of living. It
has consistently ranked Australia among the top few nations. 9 The Economist Intelligence
Unit’s quality of urban life indicator regularly ranks Australian cities very highly. 10
Finally, Australia has fared well in international surveys of happiness conducted since the
1940s. 11
Australia’s story since Federation is ostensibly a process of rapid, transformational
economic modernisation, but the narrative is a complex and often dichotomous one.
Figure 16.1 shows that much of the income growth occurred in the second half of the
century, which was less affected by major disruptive events. However, the inclusion of a
broader wellbeing spectrum tempers this story – much of the reduction in working hours,
the introduction of household innovations, and increases in life expectancy occurred in
the first half of the century. The inter-war Depression, for example, belies the expansion
in consumer industries and services, while World War 2 motivated advances in the
organisation and technology of manufacturing in Australia, as it did elsewhere. Finally,
the impact of improved nutrition on living standards is suggested through anthropometric
studies showing rising heights among army recruits when comparing the two world
wars. 12
Everyone did not share equally in this enhanced wellbeing. Income, and particularly
wealth, continued to be unevenly distributed, although progressive taxation regimes and
the growing social wage associated with public provision of services appear to have
helped to narrow the income gap. The historical evidence to measure inequality is limited
by few data points and differing forms of measurement over time. The conclusions of
different writers are not always consistent but point to a secular decline in inequality
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Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, ‘Happiness and the Human Development Index: Australia Is Not a Paradox’,
Australian Economic Review, 39, 2 (2006): 176–84.

12

Greg Whitwell and Stephen Nicholas, ‘Weight and Welfare of Australians, 1890–1940’, Australian Economic
History Review, 41, 2 (2001): 59–75.

between the 1930s and 1970s. 13 Anthony Atkinson and Andrew Leigh’s study of the
income share of the wealthiest 10 per cent broadly confirms these trends. They also find
that in the final two decades of the century inequality appears to have risen slightly due to
lower top marginal tax rates, skill-based technological change and shifting attitudes to
inequality. 14
Notable for their absence, however, are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
who appear not to have shared substantially in most of the improvements in both income
and wellbeing. Indeed, it was not until after the 1967 constitutional amendment that
serious attempts were made to collect widespread information about the Indigenous
population. The census of 1971 confirmed Indigenous people had been left behind on
most wellbeing indicators. Analysis of census returns over the following 30 years has
revealed evidence of a slow process of ‘closing the gap’ on most key indicators,
significantly in unemployment rates, school attendance and post-school qualifications. 15
Finally, in spite of the rapid advances of the last 100 years, Australia’s relative
economic standing internationally has declined for most of the century. In the middle of
the nineteenth century, Australia, along with New Zealand, had the highest per capita
income in the world. By the 1920s it had been matched or surpassed by New Zealand, the
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. 16 This ‘lost exceptionalism’ has been
widely debated among economic historians who seek to understand whether this was
merely an expected adjustment as the small population denominator grew rapidly or if
Australian competitiveness was in decline. 17 However, there has been some reversal since
the early 1990s with Australia’s per capita GDP growing more quickly than the

13

Ian McLean, ‘Economic Wellbeing’, pp. 331–5.

14

Anthony B. Atkinson and Andrew Leigh, ‘The Distribution of Top Incomes in Australia’, Economic Record, 83,
262 (2007): 247–61.

15

Jon C. Altman, Nicholas Biddle and Boyd H. Hunter, ‘A Historical Perspective on Indigenous Socio-Economic
Outcomes in Australia, 1971–2001’, Australian Economic History Review, 45, 3 (2005): 273–95.

16

Ian McLean, ‘Australian Economic Growth in Historical Perspective’, Economic Record, 80, 250 (2004): 332,
table 1b.

17

Stephen Broadberry and Douglas A. Irwin, ‘Lost Exceptionalism? Comparative Income and Productivity in
Australia and the UK, 1861–1948’, Economic Record, 83, 262 (2007): 262–74; Bryan Haig, ‘Real Product and
Productivity of Industries since the Nineteenth Century: A Comment on “Lost Exceptionalism” by Broadberry
and Irwin’, Economic Record, 84, 267 (2008): 511–14.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average. 18 Table
16.1 compares Australia’s twentieth-century growth performance with some key
advanced industrial or resource-based economies. It shows a mixed picture, with
Australian incomes growing more quickly than the United Kingdom, New Zealand and
Argentina but more slowly than the United States, Canada and Norway.
Table 16.1. Index of comparative real gross domestic product per capita, 1901–2000
Year

Argentina

New Zealand

UK

Australia

USA

Canada

Norway

1901

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

1913

132

122

111

134

119

144

129

1929

152

125

124

137

155

164

178

1938

141

153

141

153

137

147

224

1950

173

200

156

193

214

235

286

1973

277

294

270

336

374

447

595

1991

242

316

363

442

512

590

1,001

2000

298

385

457

566

638

726

1,320

Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) – Angus Maddison Homepage, ‘Statistics
on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD’, table 3
<http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm>, accessed 1 April 2012. Based on constant prices in
1990 International Geary–Khamis dollars.

The debate is of broader significance because understanding the country’s role in the
international or global economy is rightly a key concern of Australian economists and
economic historians. Australia’s characterisation as a highly internationalised economy is
confirmed by figures that measure international trade’s share of GDP, the migrant
proportion of the population and the magnitude of foreign investment. 19 Exponents of
staple theory have emphasised the importance of export-led growth through the foreign
earnings from key commodities, while the consequences of protection for the Australian
economy have generated equal discussion. Among recent major contributions to
Australian economic history, David Meredith and Barry Dyster used Australia’s role in

18

Charles Bean, ‘The Australian Economic “Miracle”: A View from the North’, in David Gruen and Sona
Shrestha (eds), The Australian Economy in the 1990s (Canberra: Reserve Bank of Australia, 2000), p. 74.

19

Ian McLean, ‘Growth in a Small Open Economy: An Historical View’, in Bruce Chapman (ed.), Australian
Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of Fred H. Gruen (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989), p. 16, table 1.2.

the international economy as the organising framework for their textbook. 20 More
specifically, Ian McLean has referred to the ‘synchronous behaviour’ that has linked
vicissitudes in Australia’s economic performance to events in the international
economy. 21 Thus the inter-war Depression, the post–World War 2 boom, the recessions
of the early 1980s and 1990s, and the boom that followed into the new century were all
global economic trends. As a small player, Australia has been largely beholden to trends
in the global economy as a receiver rather than a transmitter of economic linkages. Of
importance in this relationship are both the direct economic linkages through factor and
product markets such as the international flows of labour, capital and technology, and
linkages through public policy in response to conditions in the increasingly global
economy. The geographic locus of those linkages has moved over time.

The shifting focus of economic and business activity
Economic expansion involved changing patterns of economic activity geographically,
organisationally and across sectors. At a broad sectoral level, manufacturing’s share of
economic activity progressed in the form of an inverted ‘U’ shape, rising through the first
half of the century but thereafter falling by 2000 to a share similar to that at Federation.
The resource industries, despite cyclical volatility associated with overseas demand,
generally lost share of GDP but continued to dominate exports. The diverse and underrecorded services sector held the largest broad share at the beginning of the century and
continued to increase its dominance as the century progressed. This increase was due in
part to the growth of specialist firms providing services previously hidden within
vertically integrated corporations. 22 While different measures of economic activity, such
as output, employment and capital formation, provide some variations in the magnitude
and timing of these trends, the overall conclusions remain the same. As one might expect,
the services and manufacturing sectors have dominated employment, while most farms
and mines have been more land and capital-intensive.
This pattern of structural change is consistent with generalisations of the way
economies develop: that is, a shift occurs from primary to secondary industry as

20

David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy: Continuity and Change (Cambridge
University Press, 1999).

21

McLean, ‘Growth in a Small Open Economy’, pp. 7–10; Ian W. McLean, Why Australia Prospered: The
Shifting Sources of Economic Growth (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 18–19, 100–1.

22

Michael Carter, ‘Services’, in Maddock and McLean (eds), The Australian Economy in the Long Run, pp. 222–
3.

economies industrialise, with the latter in turn yielding ground to services in the postindustrial age. It also broadly approximates the distribution of economic activity across
the twentieth century in other developed economies such as the United Kingdom, the
United States and Canada. 23
The contribution of the sectors to international trade, however, sets Australia apart
from many economically developed nations. Resource exports have remained dominant
(about 75–95 per cent of visible exports), far exceeding the sector’s diminishing share of
GDP (about 10–25 per cent) and helping to pay for negative balances from manufacturing
imports. 24 At its mid-century peak, manufacturing’s approximately 30 per cent share of
GDP was similar to many industrialised nations but its share of exports remained much
lower. 25 The non-tradable nature of many services meant that their contribution to the
international sector was much less than to the domestic economy. Exceptionally,
education services expanded rapidly in the final two decades of the century to become the
biggest export earner after coal and iron ore as large numbers of foreign students studied
in Australia. Australia is thus part of a small group of developed resource-based
economies that include Norway, New Zealand and Canada.
The broad sectoral trends conceal significant innovation and change at a higher level
of disaggregation, which has generally been more difficult to measure with precision.
Within manufacturing, individual industries and their products rose and fell in response to
innovation, the entrance of foreign multinationals, changing consumer tastes, and trade
policy. In the early years of the century, manufacturing was clustered in bulky, low-value
goods that used basic technology, such as in building materials, clothing and primary
metals – though some continuous process, mass-production technology was emerging in
food processing industries such as milling, brewing and distilling. Manufacturing’s
expansion after 1918 was broadly based, drawing on traditional industries such as foods
and textiles, and emergent sectors, particularly electrical equipment and vehicle
construction and use. The disruption to sea trade during World War 2 provided the
opportunity to expand through import substitution into sectors such as machine tools, in

23

Ibid., pp. 198–200.

24

John W. Freebairn, ‘Natural Resource Industries’, in Maddock and McLean (eds), The Australian Economy in
the Long Run, p. 160; Ian McLean, ‘Why Was Australia So Rich?’, Explorations in Economic History, 44, 4
(2007): 635–56.

25

Kym Anderson, ‘Tariffs and the Manufacturing Sector’, in Maddock and McLean (eds), The Australian
Economy in the Long Run, pp. 166–9.

which producers had previously been uncompetitive compared with large-scale foreign
enterprises.
In the 1950s and 1960s industrial expansion was viewed as the path to further
economic development in Australia, which fostered increases in protection through
quotas and local content requirements to support import substitution in particular
industries. Symptomatic of this were the government incentives in favour of local
production of engines and chassis that motivated the first entirely Australian-built car in
1948 by Holden. 26 By the end of the 1960s, manufacturing’s share of GDP had begun to
decline. Tariff policy played a complex role: on the one hand, the shelter provided by
persistently high tariff levels, peaking in the 1970s, weakened underlying international
competitiveness; on the other, subsequent tariff reductions pushed domestic producers out
of business. Other factors included the emergence of new industrial nations in Southeast
Asia with lower labour costs, while the rising global scale of manufacturing made it
difficult for a nation with a small labour force and market to build international
competitiveness in many industries. 27 By the final decades of the twentieth century, a
smaller but technologically more sophisticated manufacturing sector found a competitive
niche in sub-industry sectors such as vehicle components. As a result, manufacturing
raised its share of merchandise exports, particularly elaborately transformed products that
have gone through several manufacturing stages. 28
The resources sector diversified similarly. The nineteenth-century staples of wool,
wheat, coal and gold yielded share to the exploitation of a widening range of resources
including refrigerated food products, oil, gas, uranium, iron ore, bauxite, alumina, nickel,
manganese, fertilisers and fish farming. These advances drew upon high levels of
technological innovation brought about by interaction between the resources sector and
enabling institutions such as universities, government research institutes and the capital
goods industries. This ability to develop new resource industries and products on a

26

Robert Conlon and John Perkins, Wheels and Deals: The Automobile Industry in Twentieth-Century Australia
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 115–23.

27

Colin Forster, ‘Economies of Scale and Australian Manufacturing’, in Colin Forster (ed.), Australian Economic
Development in the Twentieth Century (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), pp. 123–68.

28

David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press), pp.
12–13.

regular basis goes a long way to explaining why Australia dodged the so-called resource
curse that causally links resource intensity to retarded economic growth. 29
The pattern of development across the twentieth century confirms the notorious
cyclical instability of resource industries, dependent both upon the vagaries of nature for
production and the whims of industrialising nations for demand. The heavy reliance on
resource exports consequently led to significant vicissitudes in the terms of trade across
the century. 30 Agricultural and pastoral output was enduring the tail end of the drought
and economic crises of the 1890s at the time of Federation. The two world wars brought
boom conditions for Australia’s pastoral industries due to the British government’s
acquisition of Australian wool at generous official prices. Curtailment of overseas
demand between the wars adversely affected Australia’s resources industries. In the
1950s and 1960s, innovation, further wars in Korea and Vietnam, and Japanese
industrialisation contributed to a restoration of healthy conditions and a spike in the terms
of trade. The 1970s and much of the 1980s witnessed a return to difficult international
trading conditions. More recently, the secular boom of the 1990s and the industrialisation
of China have provided enormous opportunities for Australian miners.
The services omnibus includes business, personal, leisure and public services. The
mix within each of these subsets varied across the century. Business activities, originally
designed to support the supply chain of primary industries, such as finance, auctioneering
and shipping, broadened with the economy to include more accounting, law,
communications, property and consultancy or advice activities. Leisure services grew,
aided by shorter working hours. Wholesale and retail services remained relatively
important but with some major changes in form, particularly the growth of mass retailing
through department and chain stores. Public services grew with the expanding role of
government in health, education and defence.
Transport services, vital for an expansive and distant nation like Australia, were
transformed by new technologies. Land-based public transport yielded ground to the
family car by the 1950s, while the rising provision and falling cost of air travel
overwhelmed shipboard passenger travel from the 1960s, although seaborne freight

29

Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review, 45,
4–6 (2001): 827–38.

30

Meredith and Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn, pp. 65, 103, 183, 227, 254, 320.

remains the dominant mode of conveyance. 31 Within the household budget, new
technologies led to shifts in service provision – whitegoods replacing domestic service
from the interwar period, live theatre and music giving way following World War 2 to
‘entertainment systems’ and, more recently, computers. Ironically, the effect in each case
has been to increase the demand for manufactured goods that use the general-purpose
technologies of electricity, the internal combustion engine and the microchip.
In spite of Federation, Australia remained firmly within the sphere of British
economic influence for several decades as Australia’s principal trade, investment and
migration partner. Up to World War 1, 44–47 per cent of Australian exports went to
Britain, from where Australia received 53–61 per cent of its imports. This reflected the
complementary relations between a merchandise and a commodity-based economy, so
that Australia exchanged wool and wheat for British manufactures. 32 By 1914, 44 per
cent of Australia’s long-term stock of international capital had come from the United
Kingdom. 33 Finally, nearly 80 per cent of immigrants arriving in Australia on the eve of
World War 1 came from the United Kingdom and Ireland. 34 Australia’s subservience to
the needs of the British Empire was apparent in other ways – it was part of the ‘sterling
bloc’ of countries that was established following devaluation of the pound in 1931, all of
which linked their currency to that of Britain, kept their gold reserves in London, and
participated in the 1932 Ottawa Agreement of an ‘imperial preference’ customs union.
Yet Australia gradually broke away from British mediation of its international
economic relations to build trade and investment with most major economies, including
the USA, Canada, Japan, China and the principal Western European countries.
Reorientation occurred in several phases. By the inter-war years the USA was increasing
its share of Australian exports and imports, a trend that continued through to the 1960s.
By then, though, Australia’s export market had begun to shift again – towards Japan,
whose steel mills became eager consumers of Australian coal and iron ore as a result of

31

Graeme Davison, Car Wars: How the Car Won Our Hearts and Conquered Our Cities (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin, 2004); Jim Davidson and Peter Spearritt, Holiday Business: Tourism in Australia since 1870
(Melbourne University Press, 2000), ch. 10.
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Meredith and Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn, p. 68, table 3.1.
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Ibid., p. 45, table 2.2.

34

David Pope and Glenn Withers, ‘Wage Effects of Immigration in Late Nineteenth Century Australia’, in
Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds), Migration and the International Labour Market, 1850–
1939 (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 242.

that nation’s rapid industrialisation. Similarly, China had become the principal destination
of Australian exports by the 1990s. 35
These trading shifts were mirrored relatively closely by investment, particularly with
the arrival of large numbers of American manufacturing multinationals into Australia
from the 1920s including Ford (1925), General Motors (1926) and Monsanto (1928),
followed in turn by Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi (1926), Toyota (1958) and
Sumitomo (1961). American and Japanese firms transferred skills, technology and
organisational thinking that were vital to the modernising Australian economy. By the
1980s there were major investment flows in the opposite direction as Australian firms
engaged in resources, services and manufacturing expanded overseas, particularly in
Europe and the United States but also to smaller affiliates in New Zealand and Asia. 36
Australia’s outward stock of foreign direct investment increased in nominal terms from
$2 billion to $117 billion between 1980 and 2003; as a share of GDP, this was a
remarkable rise from less than 2 per cent to 23 per cent. 37
Within Australia, the key geographic shifts in economic activity were associated with
rising levels of urbanisation. The urban share of population rose from 49 to 86 per cent
between 1901 and 1981 before declining slightly in the following two decades.38 Sydney
and Melbourne consolidated their leadership as the principal economic and demographic
conurbations. This trend, related largely to rising manufacturing output and the growing
services sector, motivated heavy investment in urban utilities such as water, gas,
electricity and sewerage. While the rural sector’s share of output gave up some ground,
the relocation of the international wool market from London to the Australian port cities
required substantial new investments in sale rooms, display and storage warehouses to

35

Meredith and Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn, p. 192, table 8.4; Kym Anderson, ‘Australia in
the International Economy’, in John Nieuwenhuysen, Peter Lloyd and Margaret Mead (eds), Reshaping
Australia’s Economy: Growth with Equity and Sustainability (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 38–9.
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David Merrett, ‘Australian Multinationals in Historical Perspective: “Do You Come from a Land Down
Under?”’, in Howard Dick and David Merrett (eds), The Internationalisation Strategies of Small Country
Firms: The Australian Experience of Globalisation (Cheltenham: Elgar), pp. 26–7.
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Ibid., p. 25, table 2.3.
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J.C. Caldwell, ‘Population’, in Vamplew (ed.), Australians, p. 40; Graeme Hugo, ‘A Century of Population
Change’, in Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia, 2001, cat. no. 1301.0 (Canberra: ABS, 2001).

support the new auction system. 39 Many foreign buyers from Europe and Japan set up
offices in Sydney and Melbourne to be close to the market. Sydney and Melbourne’s
growing domination of urban manufacturing and services reflected an increasing regional
specialisation in economic activity as Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland
developed their resource-based industries, particularly mining, timber and agriculture.
Big business, both Australian and foreign-owned, became an essential part of the
landscape of the Australian economy in the twentieth century. Initially, the largest
enterprises were government-owned, a consequence of public responsibility for major
forms of infrastructure such as railways and postal communications originating in the
colonial socialism of the late nineteenth century. The Victorian Railways and New South
Wales Railways managed the largest portfolios of capital and labour before 1914. Some
utility industries, such as electricity, came under government ownership from the 1920s
and a further, though temporary, phase of public ownership occurred after World War 2.
However, the predominant feature of the emergent business economy was the rise of
large-scale corporations reaching out across a national landscape. Multinationals flocked
to Australia, attracted by the growing local consumer market and the need to jump tariff
barriers. Domestic firms responded to similar impulses and were able to seek funding
from the emerging local capital market as new issues became easier to raise and more
firms were regularly traded on the state-based stock exchanges. As was the case in other
nations, the largest firms tended to cluster in the expanding manufacturing sector,
although diversifying resource firms provided an additional dimension to corporate
expansion in Australia: for example, the miner Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) began steel
production in Newcastle (1915) and Port Kembla (1935), while the Colonial Sugar
Refining Company (CSR) diversified into building materials, beginning with vinyl
flooring (1949) and hardboard (1959). Large-scale enterprise also moved increasingly
into farming as the number of family farms halved to little more than 100,000 in the
second half of the century, but their average size rose to meet scale imperatives and
competition from corporate producers.
While minnows compared with the leading firms of Britain or the United States, the
largest firms were mammoths within Australia. For better or worse, they cast shadows
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David Merrett, Stephen Morgan and Simon Ville, ‘Industry Associations as Facilitators of Social Capital: The
Establishment and Early Operations of the Melbourne Wool Brokers Association’, Business History, 50, 6
(2008): 781–94.

over local business longer than those of their overseas counterparts. 40 The quintessentially
Australian term ‘big end of town’ intimates a group of collusive and self-seeking
corporate leaders. In practice, however, these large firms drove cost-reducing scale
efficiencies in production, served as receptacles for technical change and labour training,
and achieved transaction cost economies through internalising many business
transactions. The smallness of the domestic economy made it impossible for more than
one or two firms in most industries to attain the scale to be internationally competitive. In
most cases, looking to build scale through overseas expansion was problematic due to
distance and an emphasis upon resource industries often unsuited to internationalisation.
From about the 1980s, however, more Australian firms expanded abroad, motivated by a
mix of country and firm-specific advantages, the increased competitiveness of Australian
firms through domestic economic reform and the opportunity to exploit expanding
overseas markets. This unfinished story remains one of limited achievement as firms
across various sectors, including finance, banking, mining, communications, brewing and
construction, pulled back investment by the end of the century.
The economic benefits wrought by large-scale enterprise were entirely consistent
with a culture of cooperation and collusion. As early as 1914 H.L. Wilkinson drew
attention to the large number of trusts covering many sectors of the economy, including
coal, tobacco, flour, fruit and shipping, many of which were colluding to raise prices or
limit output. 41 Despite the passage of the Australian Industries Preservation Act eight
years earlier, partly to combat such practices, and Wilkinson’s desire to see government
act decisively, collusion continued. By 1969 over 1,000 trade associations had been
registered under the terms of the Trade Practices Act of 1965. 42 Cooperation among firms
also brought broader benefits, particularly through sharing know-how and capital
equipment, a significant consideration for a small and distant economy, as the federal
government came to recognise by the 1990s. 43
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The largest corporations at Federation were typically both owned and managed by the
same small group of entrepreneurs, often family-based. By the final decades of the
century Australia had belatedly followed the common pattern of modern corporate
development of divorcing ownership from control with the expansion of small
shareholders and large institutional investors. Foreign multinationals provided local
exposure to best overseas practices in organisational structure and governance.44 There
were also points of difference from the experience of other nations. The vast distance of
the Australian continent presented challenges of coordination for service industries such
as banking, pastoral agency, and retailing. This encouraged a form of ‘organic’
multidivisional organisation whereby the company leveraged its core competences in
branches spread far and wide but ultimately relied upon a significant degree of autonomy
at each location. 45 That they chose their local staff carefully benefitted the largest firms,
which could draw upon an internal labour market of known and trusted employees
seeking to build their career within a single firm.

Drivers of economic growth
The sources of a nation’s economic growth and development can be examined at different
levels. Increases in the scale of supply and demand will generate expanded economic
activity. The sources of supply and demand, though, rarely remain unchanged: as was
seen in the previous section, the patterns of activity altered as the Australian economy
grew. Productivity, an increase in outputs relative to a given level of inputs, plays a key
role in several respects. Higher levels of output can often be achieved more efficiently
through economies of scale. New combinations of factor inputs, often the result of
technical change, can also increase production efficiency. Innovations in one sector may
spill over to the benefit of other parts of the economy through production linkages or
shared learning environments. Economies are unlikely to achieve sustained expansion
over time without productivity gains as well as increases in inputs. One study estimates
that two-thirds of Australian economic growth from Federation to 1979 was attributable
to factor accumulation and one-third to increased productivity. 46
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At a deeper level of analysis, why have some economies fared better than others at
responding to the opportunities available in the international economy and in achieving
growth-inducing productivity improvements? Comparative economic history has
recorded much, but agreed little, on the critical set of growth-inducing conditions for an
economy, debating the role of government policy, the natural environment, social-cultural
relations and the influence of institutions. While this level of analysis of causality is more
profound than estimates of factor accumulation and productivity change, it is far more
difficult to reach universally accepted conclusions. The deeper determinants of economic
development in Australia, as in any nation, are a complex and contested terrain.
Australia’s population grew steadily through the twentieth century. While expanding
more slowly than in the nineteenth century, Australia stood out among most developed
countries for its rapid demographic expansion. 47 Natural increase provided most of the
overall growth in population, but immigration made an important contribution to the
development of the workforce. Immigration’s share of population increase moved in a
strongly pro-cyclical manner with economic fluctuations, suggesting its importance in
filling labour market shortages in upturns while not increasing unemployment rates
during downturns such as in the 1930s. Government policies of selective skill criteria,
assisted passages and facilitated settlement all assisted the needs of the domestic labour
market. Migration contributed as much as 45 per cent to the growth of the labour force in
the post–World War 2 years when the manufacturing sector, with its heavy demand for
labour, grew quickly. 48 The gradual shift away from the white Australia policy provided a
wider pool of foreign labour on which to draw. The earlier policy had been premised
partly on the potential threat to the employment of domestic workers if large numbers of
migrants had arrived from low-wage countries. David Pope and Glenn Withers have
drawn attention to the contribution of migrants to aggregate demand as consumers, as
well as being part of the workforce. 49
The labour force participation rate – the share of those aged between 15 and 64
working or seeking work – has remained fairly steady since Federation at between about
60 and 70 per cent, reflecting the economy’s ability to continually absorb new workers as
the population expanded. This aggregate statistic conceals significant changes in
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workforce composition, mainly since 1945, with the growth of female workers (especially
married women), the reduced participation of older male workers, and the expansion of
part-time and casual employment. Reflecting broader economic trends, much of this
growth occurred in manufacturing and the large, labour-intensive service sector.
Employment in farming stagnated while mining’s decline reflected the growing capital
intensity of the sector.
Increased labour productivity was achieved mostly by improvements in the human
capital of the workforce, the effectiveness with which skills were assigned to relevant
tasks, and changes in the organisation and technology of production. Literacy rates were
already comparatively high in the late colonial period. The growth of secondary school
participation rates and increases in per capita funding of education occurred largely in the
decades after 1945. Technical training and tertiary education expanded most markedly in
the final years of the century. This supports the view that factor accumulation rather than
factor productivity growth predominated in Australia for much of the century and created
a lag compared with nations such as the United States, which had already invested more
heavily in human capital. 50
Internal labour markets, as receptacles of training and of appropriate career
progression and task assignment, provided an alternative avenue for improved labour
productivity. Several large organisations, including the Union Bank of Australia and
Victorian Railways, operated internal labour markets by the beginning of the twentieth
century, although these practices emerged more belatedly among other major firms. 51
American multinationals infused the latest thinking on the bureaucratic organisation of
large-scale enterprise. From the late nineteenth century, American unidivisional (U-form)
enterprises organised specialist career managers into functional departments (such as
finance, marketing, research and production). From about the 1920s, multidivisional (Mform) enterprises decentralised operations into product or geographic divisions that
competed for the firm’s resources. Both structures derived primarily from the American
corporate economy, which they served well in employee motivation and skill
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specialisation. 52 Hybrid forms were adopted in Australia, for example, by CSR, but
generally not until after World War 2. Insufficient scale and the persistence of family
ownership constrained earlier development. By the mid-1970s most leading Australian
manufacturers had adopted the M-form. 53
Rapid increases in the capital stock similarly emphasised factor accumulation as a
driver of Australian economic growth. 54 Capital formation in the early decades extended
the heavy investments in pastoralism, the railways and urban infrastructure, which had
dominated expenditure prior to Federation. The railway network almost doubled in length
from 20,240 kilometres in 1901 to 37,492 kilometres in 1921. 55 By the inter-war period,
manufacturing was a growing consumer of capital for the construction of factories and
production of modern machinery. New technology, mostly from the United States and
Europe, altered the nature of production. Innovation in both new and old industries relied
upon the twin general-purpose technologies of electricity and automobiles to drive
growth. Scale economies through mass-production methods reduced costs and enabled
market leaders to emerge such as Tooth (brewing), Henry Jones (jam), Australian Glass
Manufacturers, and Herald and Weekly Times (newspapers). 56 Thus manufacturing was
much better placed to contribute to the war effort in World War 2 and in turn received a
greater boost than in World War 1, with substantial investments in new or existing
factories by the Department of Munitions.
The critical mass achieved by some corporate leaders enabled them to invest in
intangible forms of marketing capital such as branding and advertising. This was
particularly the case among firms in food and drinks products such as Carlton United
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Brewery and Goodman Fielder. Henry Jones was using the IXL brand as early as the
1890s to build market share and generate production scale economies. In the 1920s Bert
Appleroth used a series of gimmicks and saturation advertising to promote ‘Aeroplane
Jelly’, while Berlei focused on marketing women’s undergarments that were designed
scientifically to fit more comfortably. 57 In general, though, Australian firms were slow to
develop brands compared with American or British ones. 58
The boom decades of the 1950s and 1960s raised investment levels in the public and
private sectors. Businesses sought to overcome the paucity of wartime investment, catch
up with overseas developments in the new consumer durable industries and fill the pentup demand for their products. Productivity surged ahead, driven by the expansion of
innovative sectors in chemicals, metals and engineering – manufacturing output per
employee grew at levels of above 4 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s compared with barely
1 per cent in earlier decades. 59 The suburbanisation of cities and the growth of vehicle
ownership in turn motivated new public infrastructure investments in roads, utilities and
telecommunications. The upshot of all this was that the ‘investment ratio’ of capital
formation to GDP rose to the very high level of around 25 per cent.60 Although economic
growth slowed after about 1970, investment remained high and shifted towards mining,
and financial, business and property services.
The growing services sector generated a series of productivity-enhancing innovations.
From the 1960s a stream of advances in information technology benefitted business
services by developing electronic systems for processing and storing data. This was
clearly evident in the banking industry. At Westpac the milestones were electronic data
storage from the 1960s and electronic processing from the 1970s, which facilitated
automatic teller machines from 1980, electronic funds transfer from 1984, telephone
banking from 1994 and internet banking from 1998. 61 These changes improved labour
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productivity and refocussed capital needs from the bricks and mortar of branches to
modern information and communications technologies (ICT) systems. The 1990s were a
tipping point for the uptake of ICT more generally: vast improvements in computer
capabilities and the demand for them transformed price–performance ratios. 62 Australians
benefitted from this shift of the terms of trade in favour of user nations. Construction and
wholesale and retail trade, as well as finance, became major users. Supply chains
operated more efficiently through innovations such as electronic tagging, which enabled
firms to reduce inventory holdings.
Domestic personal savings emerged in the twentieth century as the principal source of
investible funds for new capital formation as foreign investors responded warily to the
economic turmoil of the 1890s and the local capital market began to take shape.
Government banks, especially savings banks, filled the gap left by private trading banks
and helped to mobilise individual savings. World War 1 brought further opportunities for
individual savers through subscription to war loans. 63 The State-based stock exchanges,
formerly drawing largely upon mining stock, diversified into manufacturing. Aided by
investment advice from stockbrokers such as J.B. Were, and the growth of a financial
press, investors were enticed to purchase new issues in firms that promised to make the
most of exciting, occasionally dubious, overseas innovations such as sound and motion
pictures, vehicle components, optical and x-ray equipment, and cordial and aerated
drinks. The number of securities traded on the Melbourne Stock Exchange rose from 149
to 562 between 1907 and 1939, while the average number of shareholders in the thirteen
largest companies across Australia rose from 1,029 in 1912 to 6,102 in 1954.64 The
growing maturity of capital markets provided an effective response to the high post–
World War 2 investment ratio. Stock market listings grew and institutional investors
(insurance companies and pension funds) exercised increasing influence, while
privatisations attracted growing interest from small individual investors. The bond market
matured considerably; issues became more regular, provided a more varied set of
maturity dates and attracted an active secondary market. 65
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That the Australian economy was blessed with high rates of capital formation is
unquestioned. Measuring the productivity of this capital is a lot more difficult,
particularly the social overhead capital required in a rapidly developing economy for
communications, urban utilities and housing. Railways are a case in point: they absorbed
substantial volumes of investment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but
there is little agreement on how best to assess productivity of the railways due to their
indirect and lagged impacts on output. 66
An alternative approach is to ask whether the best choices were made between
investment alternatives and how these decisions were reached. W.A. Sinclair drew
attention to the weaknesses in public investment decision making due to inadequate
appraisal of, and insufficient coordination between, projects.67 The contested opinions of
policy makers at the time, and among historians more recently, have polarised into two
schools of thought. The pursuit of urban-based manufacturing with the supporting
infrastructure as the path to economic modernisation in most developed nations is set
against the comparative advantages of primary industries based in rural communities as
the traditional backbone and wealth generator of the developing Australian economy.
Timothy Coghlan, government statistician for New South Wales, had warned as early as
1904 that ‘the abnormal aggregation of the population into their capital cities is a most
unfortunate element in the progress of these states’. 68 This can be extended to include the
idea that policy as a whole was slanted in favour of the cities due to their demographic
and electoral dominance. Tariffs favoured urban manufacturing at the expense of rural
exports and ‘tapered’ railway freight rates favoured large urban manufacturers at the
expense of smaller rural firms in the same industries. Finally, the urban economic
expansion was seen as crowding out factor markets, particularly through higher wages.
In practice, there was greater balance since tariffs were offset by substantial rural
industry assistance. By lowering average charges on longer hauls, tapered freight rates
also helped rural exporters and fostered a pattern of regional specialisation within States.
Capital markets were often segmented, with rural funds derived from specialist providers
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such as stock and station agents and local banks, while urban infrastructure was typically
funded by government bonds. At the heart of modern Australian economic development
has been the synergistic relationship between rural production and urban services (such as
finance, insurance, marketing and transport), both vital to export-led development.
Land, as a factor of production, is often excluded from the modelling of developed
economies on the grounds that it is insignificant to the manufacturing and services
sectors. However, a broader notion of geography and environment is important to the
development of all economies. 69 The rural versus urban debate is an example of the
influence of geography but there is far more to be said about its role in Australia. The
most enduring thesis from this perspective is Geoffrey Blainey’s Tyranny of Distance,
which emphasises the impact of Australia’s remote geographic location on the country’s
pattern of economic development. 70 The remoteness felt by settlers in the nineteenth
century began to fade in the twentieth. Steam, then motorised shipping, together with the
ocean cable, shortened and regularised external and internal communication times by the
early twentieth century. Subsequent technological developments, including motor
vehicles, air transport, telephones and information technology, brought down the cost and
improved the ease and effectiveness of transport and communications to a degree that
enabled Australians to mitigate many aspects of the tyranny of distance. At the same
time, key economic activities were increasingly repatriated to Australia, including
commodity markets, capital markets and corporations. Finally, the industrialisation of
much of East Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, along with changing
immigration patterns and cultural attitudes within Australia, brought the geography of the
global economy much closer to Australian shores.
Environmental challenges continued to shape the Australian economy in the twentieth
century, including a harsh climate (inconsistent or low rainfall, temperature extremes) and
geology (sparse river systems, semi-arid interior), which limited population settlement
and agricultural expansion. These challenges were met with some carefully considered
responses. Modern farming technology made better use of limited water supplies, while
financial innovations helped to spread the risk between years of dearth and plenty. Our
understanding of the role of the natural environment should also be appreciated through
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its munificence: the natural resource industries have continued to occupy a central place
in Australian prosperity and development in the twentieth century.
Underpinning Australia’s continued progress were the institutional arrangements
governing economic development. Institutions are perhaps best understood as ‘rules of
the game’ that help to constrain and encourage behaviour. As Douglass North has shown,
optimal institutions must be dynamic by adapting to change as well as helping to drive
it. 71 The colonial institutions imported into Australia from Britain had been adapted to
meet local conditions. The economic, financial, labour and climatic crises of the 1890s,
together with the unification of the colonies through Federation, necessitated further
institutional adaption. British investors turned their back on many Australian companies
following losses on speculative mining ventures, while the London boards of freestanding
companies in Australia began to understand the growing ineffectiveness of management
by remote control. Strikes by shearers, miners and maritime workers asserted the
egalitarian aspirations of the Australian workforce, while colonial institutions offered no
effective response to the drought. Federation provided the opportunity to design national
solutions that would allow a more independent role for Australia in the global economy.
Institutional change favoured the growth of national capabilities directed largely by
the regulatory hand of government. The Lyne tariff schedule of 1908 initiated a long
period of import protection designed to boost domestic manufacturing. Further major
increases in protection occurred with the Greene Tariff of 1921 and the Scullin Tariff of
1929–31. Many other adjustments were orchestrated by the Tariff Board, which was
established in 1921 and remained influential into the second half of the century. 72 Import
quotas were also used in the 1950s. By the late 1960s the effective rate of protection for
manufacturing (allowing for the impact of the tariffs on inputs as well as outputs) had
reached 36 per cent.73 Attempts were also made to protect domestic industry from foreign
competition through the Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906. Succour was
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similarly provided to agriculture from the 1920s through marketing boards, price support
schemes, and international commodity agreements.
Labour markets and industrial relations became highly centralised and regulated. The
industrial unrest of the 1890s fostered arbitration between employer and employee
groups. The 1904 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act established the
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to prevent and settle industrial
disputes covering two or more states; by 1929 it presided over 59 per cent of wage
changes. 74 A range of regulatory and conciliation bodies continued to exist at the State
level.
The hand of government regulation was prominent in financial markets, particularly
through the Commonwealth issue of currency from 1910, the publicly owned
Commonwealth Bank in 1912, and the powers conferred on the Loan Council in 1927 to
determine the volume of public sector borrowing. From World War 2 the Commonwealth
Bank assumed the role of central banker and regulator of monetary policy; the central
banking function was hived off to form the Reserve Bank of Australia in 1960.
Government regulation of financial markets increased, particularly as a result of wartime
controls in 1942 and two banking acts in 1945. As David Merrett has noted, ‘At the end
of the war, the Australian privately-owned banking system was tightly regulated in almost
every respect’. 75
Australians took a major leap forward in seeking to design institutions oriented
towards the needs of national development. To say that these institutional arrangements
built scale more than they did efficiency would be consistent with the story of factor
accumulation over increased productivity. The combination of subsidised agriculture,
tariffs, centralised wage fixing and regulated financial markets created a significant
misallocation of resources in a high-cost, high-price economy. Besides the misallocation
of resources through a heavily regulated environment, such policies became increasingly
bureaucratic over time with a plethora of rules and enforcement bodies at different levels
of government that made them difficult and costly to enforce. A.G. Kenwood’s analysis
of Australian institutions has drawn attention, for example, to the existence by the 1920s
of 10 federal and in excess of 50 State agricultural marketing authorities. 76
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While not the only reason for manufacturing’s expansion, tariffs sheltered domestic
firms from overseas competitors long after the infant industry argument had expired. The
OECD’s 1973 annual survey of the Australian economy attributed faltering economic
performance to weak competitiveness brought on in part by protectionist policies. The
Crawford Committee reached a similar conclusion six years later in support of reduced
protection. Centralised wage agreements based primarily upon social justice were
criticised for failing to align rewards with skills and thus discouraging human capital
investment. Competition policy was criticised more for its absence, the 1906 Act having
become a dead letter. During the inter-war downturn governments encouraged firms to
cooperate to share costs and reduce oversupply in production, a pattern taken much
further by the Department of War Organisation of Industry (1941–45), which forced
rationalisation. The 1981 Australian Financial System Inquiry drew attention to
distortions created by segmentation among different types of provider and the mismatch
between official and market rates of interest. In addition, there was a confusing set of
exchange controls, while competition from foreign banks was prohibited.
A shift in institutional arrangements began to occur in response to these pressures,
bringing a change from a regulated towards a deregulated environment. Governments
were also conscious of similar moves in major economies such as the United States and
the United Kingdom. Centralised wage determination was under pressure from the 1950s
as actual wages pushed ahead of those centrally determined. However, the principal
changes emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as it became clear that the Australian economy
needed to become more competitive. Centralised wage policies were gradually
abandoned: indexation for the cost of living was removed in 1981 by the Australian
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and by 1993 a half of salary and wage earners
were covered by enterprise-based agreements at the individual workplace. 77 Financial
reforms relaxed exchange controls and the permissible activities of financial institutions,
and attracted greater involvement by foreign lenders. Dismantling of the tariff regime
began in the 1970s and continued through the next two decades, so that the effective rate
of protection had fallen to around 5 per cent by 2000. 78 Competition policy was
revitalised from the 1960s, initially directed against inter-firm collusion under the 1965
Trade Practices Act. Major changes occurred with 1974 legislation that established a
Trade Practices Commission, concentrated on broad general guidelines rather than
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individual cases, with powers that included consumer protection and substantial penalties.
Subsequent legislation defined anti-competitive behaviour, initially by a dominance
(market share) test and then by use of economic theory to predict the consequences of
particular types of behaviour. The establishment of the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission in 1995 was the culmination of these policies under a principal
federal authority.

Contemporary resilience or dependent fragility?
This chapter began with the story of economic achievement in twentieth-century
Australia that has enabled people, on average, to become much wealthier and have a far
greater choice over how to spend their longer lives. Progress came in fits and starts, and
not everyone shared equally in these advances. While the century began with a belated
recovery from the crises of the 1890s, it ended on the crest of an extended period of
prosperity that ran for a decade and a half from 1992 until the global financial crisis
(GFC) of 2007–08. Australia not only performed better than most in the 1990s, it was less
seriously affected by the subsequent economic and financial crisis. Such progress and
then resilience might suggest that the achievements of the twentieth century have taken
on a self-sustaining nature; that an optimal set of institutions had emerged iteratively to
temper regulation with market incentives; that a balanced and receptive view of
Australia’s role in the world economy had been achieved by casting off both dependency
on Britain and a national fortress mentality; that the tyranny of distance had been tamed
by modern communications and Asian industrialisation; that a modern national
innovation system will sustain productivity improvements into the future; and finally that
the angst of constrained industrialisation and reliance upon unpredictable resource
industries had been dismissed as a falsehood.
It may be possible to talk in terms of economic maturity in some of these respects,
although the story of robust future proofing reveals some sensitive fault-lines. While
productivity appears to have had an enhanced role in economic progress in the second
half of the twentieth century, its growth has been irregular and most recently has begun to
tail off once more.79 Recent reports on the innovation system that underpins productivity
have identified some key problems. These include low investment in research compared
with most OECD nations, particularly in business investment. Similarly, comparatively
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low levels of public investment in education will restrict the vital contribution of human
capital to innovation. It has also been suggested that weak communication and
collaboration exists among key parts of the innovation system, especially between public
bodies and industry. 80 The most recent and comprehensive analysis of innovation,
Venturous Australia, listed 72 recommendations.
The tyranny of distance has been mitigated and Australia has engaged more
independently with global society. Yet Australia remains geographically remote and there
is no true substitute for face-to-face connection. Full engagement with recently
industrialised and industrialising East Asia throws up sociocultural challenges as well as
crystallising a dependency, for better or worse, on exporting resources and importing
manufactures. Australia seeks to find its place in a plethora of regional trade blocs, none
of which perceive Australia as core to its modus operandi. Australian firms continue to
struggle to make an impact in their overseas ventures, as witnessed by Foster’s recent
drawback of its American wine interests.
At home Australia continues to espouse a fragmented form of federalism with the
associated risks of a multitude of diverse, sometimes conflicting, official bodies. As
economic institutions look to respond to future shifts in economic development, it is not
clear whether policy reforms will be any speedier in their response than in previous eras.
Such bureaucratic pluralism is symptomatic of a broader continuity of regionalist
attitudes or State-based particularism, an outlook that stifles the development of a unified
national economy and outlook. Socioeconomic challenges facing many developed nations
are likely to operate on the Australian economy, particularly the need to respond to the
effects of climate change, an ageing society, and the unfinished business of disadvantaged
Indigenous communities.
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